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Wine production in Europe today is dominated by small family vineyards and 
cooperative wineries, while in the New World viticulture and viniculture is highly 
concentrated and vertically integrated. As a result, 70 per cent of the nation’s wine in 
the United States and Australia is produced by the top five wine companies, 50 per cent 
in Argentina and Chile, compared to figures of only 10 per cent in countries such as 
France, Italy, or Spain.2 This paper argues that these fundamental organizational 
differences have historical explanations that date from the turmoil in wine markets at 
the turn of the twentieth century. Technological change radically altered the nature of 
the industry before 1914, in particular creating economies of scale in wine making and 
allowing the commercial production of drinkable table wines in geographical regions 
where previously they had been considered too difficult. As technological change 
endangered existing rents, growers, wine-makers, and merchants lobbied governments 
to introduce laws and create new institutions that regulated markets in their favor. The 
political elite responded, supporting the creation of new institutions which helped 
preserve their own political power in the future. The political voice and bargaining 
power of the economic agents varied greatly both within, and between, countries, 
leading to the introduction of very different policies. First in France, and then in other 
European countries, the political influence of the hundreds of thousands of small 
growers forced their governments to support producer cooperatives that allowed 
growers to benefit from both the transaction cost-economizing effect of the family farm 
in grape production and the economies of scale found in wine-making, while regional 
appellations (later appellation controlee) created collective regional brands for small 
producers, thereby restricting the economic power of merchants and the tendency 
towards vertical integration. By contrast in the New World, there were few small family 
wine producers when the new wine making technologies appeared, and consequently 
their electoral influence limited. Instead, new investment in modern wineries was 
accompanied by the appearance of specialist grape producers, and a handful of 
merchants who created hierarchical organizations, integrating vertically and 
horizontally and investing heavily in advertising and brands to sell to consumers 
generally unaccustomed to wine in distant markets. By the turn of the twentieth century 
the California Wine Association controlled about 80 per cent of the region’s wine sales 
and the importer Peter Burgoyne accounted for two thirds of Australian exports to the 
                                                            
2 Anderson, Norman, and Wittwer (2004), Table 2.1 
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British. The creation of these hierarchical organizations reinforced in these markets the 
trend towards fortified dessert wines as oppose to table wines after 1900, which as late 
the 1960s accounted for at least half of national wine production.   
This paper compares the response to technological change and the demands for state 
intervention and institutional innovation in a number of very different wine producing 
nations: France, Portugal and Spain in the Old World, and Algeria, Australia and the 
United States, three countries that only began commercial wine-production during the 
period in question. Section one argues that traditional grape and wine production 
favored small scale integrated production. From the mid nineteenth century producers 
had to adapt to three major exogenous events: the integration of national and 
international markets, the appearance of new vine diseases and production shortages 
that these provoked, and the major advances in the knowledge of fermentation and the 
development of wine making equipment that produced economies of scale and which 
allowed cheap table wines to be produced in hot climates. These changes encouraged an 
expansion of production in hot climates in the New World and a shift in the locus of 
production of cheap table wines from Europe’s centre to the periphery. Thus while the 
four Midi departments and Algeria produced the equivalent of less than 15 per cent of 
France’s domestic wine consumption in the 1820s, this figure had reached 50 per cent 
by 1910.3  Other regions, such as La Mancha in Spain or Puglia in Italy experienced 
similar changes, although at later dates. By the turn of the twentieth century, a 
combination of higher yields and increase in adulteration flooded wine markets and led 
to a collapse in prices while improved wine-making technologies threaten the viability 
of thousands of small producers. The rest of the paper examines the repose to these two 
problems, and in particular the creation of cooperatives and regional appellations in 
parts of Europe, and vertical integration in California and Australia.  
 
1. Traditional wine production and technological change prior to 1914. 
Arthur Young noted in his travels through France in the late 1780s that the 
cultivation of the vine depended ‘almost entirely on manual labour …demanding no 
other capital than the possession of the land and a pair of arms; no carts, no ploughs, no 
                                                            
3 Algeria became an integral part of France after 1848, and Algièrs, Oran and Constantine were organised 
as French départements. 
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cattle’.4 In traditional viticulture there were few economies of scale, and entry costs 
were low, as the vine could be grown competitively on small plots of land marginal to 
other crops, and a couple of hectares was considered sufficient to maintain a family.5 
But transaction costs in viticulture were higher than with most other forms of 
agriculture, because nature influenced considerably both the size and quality of the 
harvest. Output was sensitive to the quality and timing of labor inputs, and vines could 
be easily and permanently damaged if the pruning, plowing, and hoeing operations were 
badly carried out.6 As a result, vines were rarely cultivated by workers other than their 
owners. Rental contracts were very rare as tenants might be been tempted to increase 
short-term output at the expense of reducing the productive life of the vine, while 
sharecropping suffered from the high costs associated with dividing the harvest.7  
Wine was a major commodity in countries such as France, Portugal and Spain, 
and provided employment for hundreds of thousands if not millions of workers. In 
France, where statistical records are relatively good, there were reportedly 1.5 million 
growers around 1890, many of whom made their own wine. In the New World numbers 
were much smaller as the industry was still relatively unimportant at this time (Table 1), 
although once again most grapes and large amounts of wine were produced on small 
family farms. For example in California there was an estimated 5,000 growers, and 
George Hussman noted that ‘the large majority of our wine growers .. are comparatively 
poor men’.8 Likewise in Victoria (Australia), 2,382 growers cultivated 1,123 hectares of 
vines in 1900, with just 72 holdings being of more than 20 hectares.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
4 Young (1794), 2, p.25. The version used here is the second chapter on ‘vines’ of the Bury St.Edmonds 
edition. 
5 Lachiver (1988), p.245. 
6 Galassi (1992) pp.78-83 and Hoffman (1984) 
7 Carmona and Simpson (2007). As Allen and Lueck (2002), p.116 note, when output is highly variable, 
‘the opportunities for the farmer to underreport (in effect, steal) the crop increase’. 
8 Roberts (1889) p.199, Pinney (1989) p.337 and Husmann (1888) p.iii. 
9 Victoria (1900), p.5. 
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Table 1 
Leading wine producing countries before 1914 
Wine production in millions of hectolitres 
 1865-74 1885-94 1909-13 
% of total in 
1909/13 
France 55.4 31.9 46.4  31.4 
Italy 23.6 31.9 46.0 31.2 
Spain 17.1 21.9 14.9 10.1 
Austria-Hungary  3.2   7.7   7.9    5.4 
Portugal   2.1   4.3   4.8   3.3 
Greece   0.2   1.8   3.2   2.2 
Germany   2.5   2.5   1.8    1.2 
Russia   3.3   3.5   1.4*    0.9* 
Rumania    0.1   2.8   1.4     0.9 
Bulgaria     0.8    0.5 
Other  European     0.9     0.6 
European total   129.5  87.8 
     
Algeria 0.2 3.1   7.9   5.4 
Argentina n.a. n.a.   4.4   3.0 
Chile n.a. n.a   2.0   1.4 
USA 0.1 0.6   1.9   1.3 
Russia (Asia)     0.9   0.6 
South Africa 0.7 0.3   0.3   0.2 
Tunisia     0.3   0.2 
Australia n.a 0.1   0.2   0.1 
Other countries 5.1 15.7   0.2   0.1 
Non-European producers   18.1 12.3 
     
World  113.5 125.3 147.6 100.0 
* Refers to European Russia 
Sources: 1865-74 and 1885-94, Morilla (1994, p.303). 1909/13. Institut International de 
Agricole 1913 and 1914 (1915, pp.110-1), Mitchell (1995, p.240), Portugal, Lains 
(1998, p.965); USA: Simpson, forthcoming, chapter nine. 
 
Europe’s traditional wine producing regions enjoyed higher population densities and 
landowners accounted for a greater percentage of the rural population compared to other 
forms of agriculture. The historian Ernest Labrousse argued that the relative equality in 
landownership and the fact that most vineyards were cultivated by their owners, implied 
that there were less conflicts, while Marcel Lachiver notes that ‘one finds more 
homogeneity in the wine-growing regions, less submission, more democratic spirit, 
more fraternity’.10  The presence of large numbers of small property owners implied 
that major problems such as the widespread destruction caused by phylloxera, or the 
                                                            
10 Labrousse (1944), p.596 and Lachiver (1988), p.246, cited in Brennan (1997), p.10 
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collapse of wine prices at the turn of the twentieth century, could be converted into 
important political issues of the day, both regionally and nationally. 
Wine-making was based on simple technologies and took place in most growers’ 
houses. The problem in 1850 was not so much an under investment in equipment as the 
lack of knowledge of why wines were good in some years, but undrinkable in others. 
According to Maynard Amerine, ‘the roles of yeasts, bacteria, enzymes, sugar, and 
oxygen were largely unknown. White wines were usually oxidized in flavor and brown 
in color; most red wines were high in volatile acidity and often low in alcohol’. As a 
result, ‘at least’ 25 percent of the wine spoiled before fermentation was complete, and 
much of the wine was of a very poor quality.11 The short life of most wines implied that 
any remaining in the cellar on eve of the harvest was thrown out to make way for the 
more valuable new wine.12  
From the mid nineteenth century individual producers had to adapt to three major 
exogenous events: the integration of national and international markets, the appearance 
of new vine diseases and production shortages that these provoked, and the major 
advances in the knowledge of fermentation and the development of wine making 
equipment that produced economies of scale and which allowed cheap table wines to be 
produced in hot climates. 
 The demand constraints placed on the wine industry were significantly reduced 
during the second half of the nineteenth century by a combination of cheap transport, 
urbanization and rising incomes. The railways helped push Europe’s wine frontier 
southwards and allowed growers in the Midi (France), La Mancha (Spain), and Puglia 
(Italy), regions long known to contemporaries as being especially suitable for the vine, 
to specialize for urban markets. Urban residents in France increased from less than ten 
per cent the population in 1800 to a quarter by 1890, with Paris by this date having over 
2.5 million inhabitants.13 Living standards improved significantly, with GDP per capita 
doubling in France, Italy and Spain between 1850 and 1913, and real wages of unskilled 
urban workers increasing by between a half and two-thirds.14 In France wine 
consumption rose from 76 liters per capita in 1850/4 to 108 liters in 1890/4, and peaked 
                                                            
11 Adams (1973) cited in Pinney (1989), p.354 and Amerine and Singleton (1976 ed.), p.21. 
12 Richard Ford noted for Valdepeñas (La Mancha) in the 1840s that ‘the red blood of this “valley of 
stones” issues with such abundance, that quantities of old wine are often thrown away, for the want of 
skins, jars, and casks into which to place the new’. Ford (1848: 1970), p.161. 
13 Urban centres as 10,000+ inhabitants. De Vries (1984), pp.45-6 and Pinchemel (1987) pp.146-7.  
14 Maddison (1995, pp.104-8), Williamson (1995), pp.164-6, and Rosés and Sánchez-Alonso (2004), 
p.407. 
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at 168 liters in 1900/4.15 The quantity consumed by producers and their families (and 
therefore exempt from taxes) grew from an annual 5 to 9 million hectoliters between 
1850/4 and 1900/4, while the increase in off-farm consumption was from 18 to 42 
million hectoliters.16 There were smaller, but significant increases in per capita 
consumption in other producer countries such as Italy, Portugal and Spain.  
This growth in consumption was all the more impressive given the fact that the 
phylloxera aphid devastated large areas of Europe’s vineyards. Phylloxera, first noticed 
in 1863, arrived on vines brought from the United States and destroyed the root system 
of Europe’s Vitis vinifera species. In time it killed most of the world’s grape producing 
vines, with the only long-term solution being to graft European varieties on phylloxera 
immune American rootstock.17 In France output, which had averaged 57.4 million 
hectoliters in 1863/75, fell to 31.7 million in 1879/92, before recovering to 52.5 million 
once more in 1899/1913. Production shortages caused by phylloxera led to higher wine 
prices and these in turn encouraged growers elsewhere to plant vines and increase 
output. In Spain, for example, wine exports rose tenfold between the early 1860s and 
late 1880s, when they were equivalent to about a third of national production.   
The low entry costs found in traditional viticulture were changed by phylloxera 
in four distinct areas. First, the uprooting of dead vines and the replanting with new 
disease resistant ones implied heavy capital costs, especially as special ploughs had to 
be used to prepare the land for the best results. Second, the vineyards were no longer 
self-sufficient, as vines could not now be replaced by layering. Instead farmers had to 
purchase from nurseries the American rootstock that was both suitable for the 
conditions of their own vineyard and compatible with the chosen European scions. 
Some combinations performed better than others, and this information was not easily 
available to growers. Third, the new vines were more delicate and more susceptible to 
fungus diseases, requiring greater expenditure on sulphur for powdery mildew, or 
‘Bordeaux mixture’ (copper salts) for downy mildew. Finally the economic life of the 
vines was considerably less than the traditional ones, between twenty and thirty years. 
Against these disadvantages, the new vines tended to come into production earlier and 
in France for example, wine yields increased from 22 hectoliters per hectare in the 
                                                            
15 Nourrisson (1990), p.321.  
16 Calculated from Degrully (1910) pp.320-1. 
17 Injecting the vine’s the roots with liquid carbon bisulphide, spraying the vines with sulphocarbonate, or 
flooding the vineyard during the winter also temporarily halted phylloxera, but was too expensive as a 
solution for most growers. 
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1870s, to 37 hectoliters in the late 1920s, although the appearance of new hybrid 
varieties, which combined resistance to disease with the need for lower labor inputs 
could, under optimal conditions, produce in excess of 100 or even 200 hectoliters per 
hectare, although of very mediocre wine.  
Scientific research in the wineries was as spectacular as in the vineyards. Pasteur 
provided a scientific background on the causes of fermentation and how to keep wines 
in conditions so that they would not ruin, although it was only at the very end of the 
period that technology permitted ordinary table wines to be pasteurized economically. 
The major breakthrough of the period was the ability to control the temperature during 
wine-making. In hot climates fermentation had often come to a premature end, and the 
sugar that was left made the wines unstable and they ruined quickly. In 1887 Paul 
Brame successfully devised a system whereby the temperature of the must was reduced 
by pumping it through tubes which were immersed in water, although it was only after 
the ‘deplorable vinification’ of 1893 that the system became widely adapted in 
Algeria.18 By the turn of the century it was noted that ‘there is probably not a single 
large cellar in Algeria, Oran, or Constantine which does not possess one or more of 
these machines, and by their use the production of a sound, completely fermented wine 
has been possible in all cases’.19  
Montpellier became the world’s centre for these new wine making technologies 
but information was exchanged internationally by such specialists as Frederic Bioletti 
(University of California, Davis), Arthur Perkins (Roseworthy, South Australia) or 
Raymond Dubois (Rutherglen, Victoria). The last decade of the nineteenth century and 
the first of the twentieth saw major investment in new large scale wineries in hot 
climates incorporating the latest technologies. In Australia for example, B.W.Bagenal, a 
student for three years at Montpellier and representative of the London importers 
W.W.Pownall in Adelaide, noted that he had personally visited seven of the best ten 
French and Algerian vineyards cited in a recent book, and therefore ‘he had confidence 
                                                            
18 Isnard (1954) pp.189-90. For similar advances in Australia, see Simpson (2009b). 
19 Bioletti (1905), p.39. This author describes two differently types of machines : attemperators, which 
pumped water or other cooling liquids through a tube in vat, and refrigerators, which consisted of a spiral 
tube outside the vat, and through which the wine was pumped, and which was cooled by a cold liquid on 
the outside. A second method – the pumping of sulphur anhydride through the must –also became widely 
used in the 1890s. The gas arrested the reproduction of the wine yeast and rendered it inactive for a 
certain time, but without killing it. By heavy sulphuring, growers could both sterilise the must, and slow 
the rate of fermentation so that it took place over two or three weeks and thereby reduce considerably the 
heat produced. Cultivated wine yeasts were now used. Growers often used a combination of both 
refrigeration and sulphuring to control fermentation.  
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in saying that there was no place he knew of where the industry was better carried on 
than at Seppeltsfield’.20 
By 1900, the new wine-making techniques included refrigerators, continuous 
presses, aero-crushing turbines, sterilizers, and pasteurizers, and these helped create 
economies of scale in five important areas. First, considerable skills were required in 
wine-making if growers were going to be able to produce a dry table wine which would 
keep. By the 1890s the leading wineries were controlling the temperature of the must 
during fermentation, correcting its acidity and using cultivated yeasts. Second, new 
wine-making technologies and cellar designs helped cut labor costs, an important 
consideration in a high wage economy such found in the New World. Third, the 
quantity of wine produced per ton of grapes increased. Fourth, merchants demanded 
large quantities of wines of a uniform style which could be repeated each year, which 
was impossible for small producers to achieve. Finally, some of the large wineries 
diversified into distilling and the production of brandy and fortified wines, where the 
economies of scale were even greater.21 In California, fortified wines increased from 17 
per cent of production in 1891/5 to 50 per cent in 1909/13. After Prohibition it was even 
higher, reaching 81 per cent in 1935, and as late as the mid 1960s half the wines in 
California and Australia were fortified dessert wines.22 
The large modern wineries required considerable quantities of grapes if they 
were to be worked at full capacity, and these could be produced either by the wine 
maker integrating backwards into grape production, or brought from specialist growers. 
Phylloxera helped growers reduce the monitoring problems associated with wage labor, 
as growers could now planted so that ploughs and horse-drawn sprays could move 
between the vines with ease. Work skills were reduced by replacing pruning knives with 
secateurs from the late nineteenth century. Vines were increasingly grown on wire 
trellises in long straight lines to facilitate the use of ploughs between the lines.23 Greater 
control over the speed and the quality of operations such as pruning, spraying, 
cultivation and harvesting was achieved as supervisors could walk between the rows to 
                                                            
20 Australian Vigneron), March 1898, p.188. The book referred to most probably was Ferrouillat and 
Charvet (1896) 
21 Further evidence of these economies of scale can be found in Simpson (forthcoming), chapter two. 
22 California. State Board of Agriculture (1915), p.139 and Sullivan (1998), p.119. For Australia, Simon 
(1966), p.xi. Simon also notes that ‘a slightly greater tonnage’ of grapes was used in the making of brandy 
and other spirits than in the making of wine. 
23 Genieys (1905), p.38, Gide (1901), pp.218-9 ; and for monitoring costs, Carmona and Simpson 
(1999a). 
 9
check an individual’s work. As Guyot, perhaps the leading writer on viticulture in the 
mid-nineteenth century noted:  
A simple glance along the line of vines, permits the owner to spot the skill or the 
negligence of his vinedressers, just as the foreman can control with the same 
ease the quantity and quality of work of each of his workers. 24      
 
The effects of vine disease and the need to replant after phylloxera created a 
distinction in areas of cheap table wines between intensive, high-yielding ‘capitalist’ 
viticulture and low-yielding, less intensive ‘peasant farm’.25  The ideal size vineyard 
according to local growers in the Midi at the turn of the twentieth century was between 
60 and 80 hectares, with economies of scale appearing after 30 hectares, but 
diseconomies on those estates of over 90 or 100 hectares.26 However, the appearance of 
large estates in the Midi reinforced the presence of the small producers as it encouraged 
cooperation among growers. Thus large owners were willing to let skilled vinedressers 
work a six hour day, finishing at two or three o'clock each afternoon so that they could 
work their own vine and phylloxera encouraged large owners to lend equipment, 
money, the use of their wineries, technical information and often the vines themselves, 
in exchange for labor service.27 The estates needed to be compact, as the potential 
economies of scale were quickly lost if the vineyard was fragmented into a number of 
small plots, a feature of many vineyards in Europe’s traditional wine regions. In 
addition in viticulture problems of moral hazard (in effort and asset use) and timing 
costs (growers were unspecialized ‘jacks of all trades’), helped the small, family grape 
producer to remain competitive in most markets throughout the twentieth century.28 In 
the New World the greater use of plows and other forms of labor saving equipment 
simply increased the size of the family vineyard, rather than encourage backward 
integration into grapes by wine makers. 
The increasing technical and capital requirements associated with wine-making 
led to the industry shifting from one that had been small scale, multi-unit and 
geographically dispersed, to one where there were economies of scale and 
concentration. While the small family farmer enjoyed some advantages over large 
estates in grape production, the economies of scale found in wine-making threatened the 
                                                            
24 Guyot (1861, p.19). 
25 Carmona and Simpson (1999a) p.307. 
26 Cited in Augé-Laribé (1907), pp.119-22. 
27  Smith (1975), p.365 and Frader (1991), pp.36 and 69. 
28 Carmona and Simpson (1999a) and Allen and Lueck (2002), p.143. 
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viability of the small producer, especially during the sharp global drop in wine prices at 
the turn of the twentieth century.  There was also a radical change in the financing of the 
sector. Traditional viticulture had been financed out of saving, in particular that of 
growers clearing and planting a small plot of vines at times when there was little 
demand for their labor. The high prices of the 1870s and 1880s encouraged a massive 
inflow of commercial capital, which made the large producers very vulnerable to the 
cyclical downturn in the early 1900s.29 
 
2. Wine and adulteration. 
While fraud had always been present in food and beverage markets, it changed 
significantly over the second half of the nineteenth century because of the growing 
physical separation between producers and consumers, and the development of new 
preservatives that allowed manufacturers to mask food deterioration and lower costs, 
often making food adulteration imperceptible to consumers. As Marc Law has recently 
noted, ‘technological developments in food manufacturing and processing during the 
late 1880s gave rise to new and cheaper products, such as oleomargarine, glucose and 
dressed beef, that threatened to undermine the market power of more traditional food 
products’.30 In particular, science increased the complexity of products, ‘creating 
opportunities for cost-saving deception by some firms through adulteration of their 
products in ways that consumers could not easily perceive’. 31 By the late nineteenth 
century, problems of wine adulteration and poor quality information for consumers 
created a ‘lemons’ problem with sherry and claret, leading to the collapse in the sales of 
genuine fine wines in the important British market.32 In 1890 wines made from sugar 
and raisins officially accounted for a sixth of French wine consumption, and in Spain 
artificial wines manufactured from imported industrial alcohol accounted for perhaps a 
quarter of the domestic markets.33 Problems associated with classifying and measuring 
product quality presented significant opportunities for cheating and adulterating wines, 
                                                            
29 Isnard (1954), p.133 and Postel-Vinay (1989) 
30 Law (2003) p.1103. In the first edition (1883) of his Traité general des vins et de leurs falsifications, 
Emile Viard wrote that it was often difficult to prove scientifically cases of fraud, while in the third 
edition (1891) he noted that both the ‘number of products used to falsify wines’ and the ‘methods of 
investigation’ to combat them had increased significantly in the short period between volumes. Cited in 
Coello Martín (2008), p.69. 
31 Law and Libecap (2004), p.3. 
32 Simpson (2004) and Simpson (forthcoming). Ridley’s noted that ‘people drink so called “Claret”, 
composed of one-third of the genuine article and two-thirds of the British imposition, and condemn, not 
the latter, but Claret’. 
33 Simpson (2005) and Antúnez (1887), p.16. 
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although the different economic agents, namely the growers, wine-makers, merchants, 
retailers, governments, and even consumers, often disagreed on what was acceptable, 
and what was not. Many consumers were happy with some forms of adulteration. In 
Paris and elsewhere, wines were fortified before entering the city to minimize taxation, 
and then watered down and blended by retailers to suit customers’ taste and keep prices 
low. Growers blamed wholesalers and retailers for adulterating their wines, but they 
themselves often used production methods which were questioned by experts. The 
addition of sugar and water to the grape pomace (marc) and adding water to obtain 
‘second’ and ‘third’ wines was common around the turn of the century, even in southern 
France. By contrast in hot climates, the grapes lack of acidity was traditionally 
overcome by adding calcium sulphate (plaster of Paris), although in France at least, 
tartaric acid was preferred by 1900.34 
The difficulties for consumers to identify adulterated products, together with the 
concern in the scientific and medical communities of their health consequences, led to 
the introduction of government legislation in many countries, In France, the 1905 law 
provided the basis for controlling fraud, including both the composition of the product 
and the labeling of the wine’s origin.35 However, it needed the massive protests in the 
Midi in 1907 to force the government to allow a grower’s organization (the 
Confédération générale des vignerons du Midi) legal powers to search out and 
prosecute illegal wine-making activities and the sale of adulterated wines. While this 
restored profitability to southern France’s and Algeria’s low quality wine producers, it 
did little to help growers in regions such as Bordeaux or Champagne, who complained 
bitterly about merchants selling inferior outside wines as from there, and who now 
demanded appellations to allow only local wines to use of the regional ‘Bordeaux’ or 
‘Champagne’ brands (section 3). Both California and New York, the two major wine 
producing states in the United States, adopted pure wine laws as early as 1887, but 
while in California the use of sugar in wine-making was prohibited, in New York it was 
allowed because the harsher climate made maturing grapes much harder. Both states 
then made considerable efforts to persuade Congress to adopt their respective 
definitions before Prohibition.36 The Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 ended the worst 
fraudulent and hazardous adulterations, but were less successful against false labelling. 
                                                            
34 The French law of 1891 made it illegal to use more than two grams of calcium sulphate per litre. Roos 
(1900), p.148. 
35 For the 1905 law, see especially Stanziani (2003, (2004). 
36 Seff and F.Cooney (1984), pp.417-8. 
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This was not surprising, as over much of the nineteenth century growers and wine-
makers everywhere had attempted to improve wine quality by copying production 
processes used to make fine wines such as sherry, port, champagne, etc., and then used 
these names to create recognizable brands in their domestic markets, as well as the 
important British market.37 Consequently in California, while the Pacific Wine and 
Spirits Review (PWSR) criticized the false wines produced in Ohio’s ‘brick vineyards’, 
it noted happily that ‘more than 2,000,000 bottles of genuine champagne are now 
annually produced in the United States’.38   
By the turn of the century, the post-phylloxera recovery in French wine output 
and widespread production of artificial wines sent prices crashing everywhere. Growers 
in the Midi sold their wines at a loss in five years out of seven between 1900 and 1906, 
and over half a million people demonstrated on the streets in Montpellier in 1907 
against the low prices and sales of adulterated wines.39 Policymakers responded to the 
industry’s demands to restrict foreign competition through tariffs, so that while 
scientific knowledge and technology moved increasingly across frontiers from the late 
nineteenth century, national wine markets by contrast became more closed.40 By 
contrast, other forms of state intervention were more controversial. 
 
3. Regional and controlled appellations 
Wine production in the nineteenth century was very competitive, globally 
decentralized, and with few barriers to entry. In addition quality varied significantly, not 
just between one plot of vines and another but also from one harvest to the next. 
Economic agents along the different commodity chains found it very difficult to supply 
a product of consistent quality, and the significant problems of asymmetrical 
information between buyer and seller made it easy to cheat and unprofitable to brand 
wines on a major scale. Most wine was sold from the barrel, and it was the reputation of 
café and bar owners that attracted clientele.  Therefore while an increasing number of 
food and beverage commodity chains in the British and US markets became buyer-
driven during this period, with a few very large companies dominating specific market 
sectors with their brands (Heinz, Quaker Oats, Cadbury, etc.), this was generally not the 
                                                            
37 By 1913, 21 per cent of all California’s wine was officially classified as port and 14 per cent as sherry. 
Calculated from the California. State Board of Agriculture (1915), p.140. 
38 Pacific Wine & Spirits Review) May, 1907, p.39. 
39 Warner (1960), p.18. 
40 Ayuda (2002) 
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case with wine.41 Successful producer-driven chains were found only with a very few 
highly specialized wines such as Moët & Chandon, where barriers to entry existed 
because of the limited supply of top-quality land and high production costs associated 
with vintage champagne.  
The integration of national markets in producer countries increased the 
negotiating powers of merchants, allowing them to purchase wines cheaply from over 
much wider areas for blending, with smaller growers in particular finding it difficult to 
sell in years of low prices. By contrast growers in European countries saw an increase in 
their political voice which they used to try and wrest some of the market power from the 
merchants. Local growers had long claimed that their better quality wines such as 
‘claret’, ‘port’, ‘champagne’ or ‘sherry’ constituted collective trademarks for a wine 
from a specific region, and now demanded that they should be protected by law by 
creating regional appellations. These would restrict the supply of grapes for a particular 
wine to a designated area, and consequently confronted local growers with others 
located outside the designated areas. They were also opposed by merchants who 
claimed that a wine’s reputation was created by them rather than the growers, and that 
they needed the freedom to purchase outside wines for blending to compensate for the 
vagaries in the local harvest and to sell at competitive prices. However, while growers 
objected to those from outside their region appropriating the local name, they faced 
formidable organization problems to create regional brands. The 60,000 or so growers 
in Bordeaux in 1900, for example, might agree not to make wines from raisins or sell 
cheap Midi wines as claret, but it remained in the interest of each that others should 
make the necessary sacrifices to maintain the region’s collective reputation, rather than 
themselves .42 Only when a grower believed that a system could adequately identify and 
punish cheats, were they likely to respect the rules themselves. The problem of defining 
exactly what the essential characteristics of claret or champagne were also created 
conflicts. If claret came from within certain boundaries in the Gironde, did that mean 
that all wines produced within the geographical area could then be considered as 
‘claret’, regardless of their quality? And, how were wines to be classified that had been 
grown in one village, and then crushed and fermented into wine in another? Could 
champagne be made with grapes grown in the Marne, but then crushed in Germany? Or 
the grapes grown in the Midi, and the wine mixed with that from Épernay to make 
                                                            
41 For the problems of selling wines in the British market, Simpson (2004).   
42 Olson (1965) p.10. 
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champagne?  While local producers argued that regional appellations were essential to 
improve local wine quality and increase information for consumers, their opponents 
claimed they served only to create geographical monopolies and shift rents to the local 
producer. As one noted, ‘with this system France will no longer be a country of free 
trade, such as was achieved with the Revolution, but a cluster of provincial monopolies 
protected by excise officers. We shall return slowly to the Middle Ages’.43  
In France, regional appellations were considered as largely irrelevant by the 
leading fine wine producers as individual brand names such as Château Margaux or 
Moët & Chandon were known to potential consumers. Demand for an appellation came 
instead from the thousands of small growers in regions such as Bordeaux and 
Champagne who were forced to compete with other wines that were being mislabeled as 
coming for these regions.44 In particular, the Midi’s growers had benefited most from 
the control in the sale of artificial wines and greater market integration (reduced rail 
freight charges, lower direct and indirect taxes), because their production costs of 
‘natural’ wines were considerably lower there than elsewhere in France. The sharply 
lower wine prices from around the turn of the century threatened producers who had 
built their reputation on quality, as their vineyards had lower yields and higher 
production costs. Local growers used their political strength to pass the 1905 law which 
provided the legal framework to establish a regional appellation. There was 
considerable opposition, but while in Champagne the question of geographical 
boundaries led to rioting and the intervention of the army in 1911, in Bordeaux growers 
agreed to include the whole department within the appellation.45 
As some merchants predicted, the major weakness of appellations was that 
although they guaranteed a wine’s origin, they could not control its quality. In 
particular, if a regional appellation was successful in raising local wine prices, this 
would encourage growers to increase output by planting on less suitable soils and use 
high-yielding vines – a classic free-rider problem. These problems started to be 
addressed in the early 1930s with a tightening of restrictions on the type of grape 
varieties that growers could use. As a result, if in 1934 there was 15.7 million 
hectoliters of wine produced by regional appellations (a fifth of France’s total 
                                                            
43 Cited in Vitu (1912), pp. 55-56. The process of establishing an effective regional appellation had two 
stages: first, the legal creation and acceptance at a national level, and then its international recognition. 
The success of European growers in achieving the necessary support to create effective local appellations 
varied considerably. This paper considers only the first stage. 
44 The situation was very different in the two regions. Simpson (forthcoming), chapters seven and eight. 
45 Simpson (2005) 
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production), by 1944 it had fallen to 5.7 million (or an eighth).46 The appellations 
controlees became operational after the Second World War, and further increased 
restrictions, controlling viticulture practices and the making and maturing of wines.47  
In effect, growers were forced to improve quality if they were to benefit from belonging 
to the appellation controlee, which in turn implied the uprooting of high yielding grap
varieties and reducing output, a move which allowed the state to reduce expenditure to 
eliminate surplus stocks. As a result, the quantity of AOC wines increased from about a 
tenth of total production in the early 1950s to a third in the late 1980s, an important shift 
as consumers moved ‘up market’, while drinking less. 
e 
                                                           
While thousands of small growers in France were able to use their political 
influence to achieve legislation that benefitted their interests, the situation was less 
favorable in countries with ‘elite democracies’. In Spain, for example, the demands 
from the mid nineteenth century by small sherry growers in Jerez for a regional 
appellation and the creation of local bank were routinely dismissed by the authorities as 
they went against the interests of a small number of powerful shipping families. Even 
when an appellation was fully approved in 1933, the shippers were still able to buy 
outside wines when harvests were poor or prices high.48 
By contrast, in Porto, the vine-growers found a considerably more sympathetic 
state, despite a government that was as unrepresentative as that in Madrid. The world’s 
first regional appellation, the Companhia Geral da Agricultura e Vinhos do Alto Douro 
(Douro Wine Company), was established in 1756 and survived until 1833, although it 
was briefly reinstated again between 1843 and 1853. No wine could be exported 
through Porto that had not been produced in the designated region, and the Douro Wine 
Company regulated the production of wine and brandy, ‘approving, classifying, and 
pricing all wine before it was sold to exporters.’49 The Douro Wine Company also 
bought wines to sell to merchants and itself traded in international markets. As Duguid 
and Silva Lopes have noted, ‘the Companhia .. defies all assumptions about 
disinterested regulators.’50 The Douro Wine Company was heavily criticized from the 
first moment in the British press, which was hardly surprising as it was seen by British 
 
46 Loubère (1990), pp.122-3 and Lachiver (1988), p.583. 
47 In French, appellation contrôlée, short for appellation d’origine controlee. 
48 The 1935 law provided a minimum length for maturing wine, a minimum alcoholic strength, controlled 
grape yields, fixed minimum export prices, and restricted export to 60 per cent of  a shipper’s stock in a 
single year. As elsewhere, there have been frequent modifications of the clauses. Fernández García 
(2008), pp.195-6. 
49 Duguid and Lopes (1999), p.87. 
50 Duguid and Lopes (1999), p.88. 
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merchants as a means to create rents and enrich the Portuguese at their expense. The 
port shippers, unlike those in Jerez, retained their British nationality, which placed them 
at a distinct disadvantage when negotiating with the Portuguese state, and a new 
regional appellation was introduced in the 1900s. By contrast the merchants were 
successful in their negotiations with the British government, and the Anglo-Portuguese 
Commercial Treaty Acts of 1914 and 1916 restricted the use of the word ‘port’ to wines 
that were produced in Portugal, a privilege that the sherry shippers only obtained after 
Spain’s accession to the European Union. 
  
Table 2.  Negotiating strength of growers and shippers in domestic markets and 
the UK in the early twentieth century 
  Domestic market  United Kingdom 
Port Growers Strong Weak 
 Shippers Weak Strong 
    
Sherry Growers Weak Weak 
 Shippers Strong Weak 
    
Champagne Growers Strong Weak 
 Shippers Weak Strong 
    
Claret Growers Strong Weak 
 Shippers Weak Weak 
 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson have argued that economic institutions are 
endogenous, and determined by political institutions and the distribution of resources in 
society, with conflicts stemming not from ‘differences in beliefs, ideology or historical 
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accidents, but from the impact of economic institutions on distribution’. The 
equilibrium structure is determined by who has the political power, and this in turn on 
the allocation of de jure political power through the structure of political institutions 
(e.g. democracy, dictatorship, etc.), and the ability of pressure groups to solve the 
collective action problems and mobilize (de facto political power).51 Table 2 
summarizes the differences in negotiating strength of growers and shippers in four 
major fine wine producing areas in their domestic markets, and in the crucial British 
export market. With port, champagne and claret, it was the growers, rather than the 
shippers that were best placed to influence government policy, and in particular, create 
regional appellations. By contrast, the strong private champagne brands, and the 
collective strength of the Porto shippers, allowed these two drinks a relatively privileged 
position in the important British market in the early twentieth century. By contrast, both 
sherry and claret suffered competition from others usurping their regional brands. 
Yet in Europe, especially outside France, the amount of wine produced by 
regional appellations was relatively small until recently. Some growers did attempt to 
produce fine wines by copying the techniques used by the leading producers in 
Bordeaux or Champagne, but even the best in Napa, La Rioja or the Yarra Valley found 
it difficult to produce a consistently good wine. However, the lack of interest in regional 
appellations had less to do with  production technologies than it did with marketing 
problems and the nature of consumer demand. Most consumers were happy to purchase 
their wines based on two variables alone: alcoholic content and price.52 
From the early 1950s there was a slow expansion in the number of controlled 
appellations in Europe, which then accelerated after 1970. In France, the quantity of 
wine increased from 15 per cent of national output in 1970 to 44 per cent by the mid 
1980s.53 Although the growth can be explained by better production methods and the 
demand by consumers for better wines, the interest of the state was now crucial. As 
European governments responded to growers’ demands, appellations were seen as a 
means of controlling output by limiting the grape varieties that could be used and 
establish maximum yields. By demanding better quality wines, the state was effectively 
also reducing output and hence the subsidies it had to pay. 
                                                            
51 Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005), p.439 and 451. 
52 Genieys (1905), p.38. Wines from the Midi were sold by alcoholic strength and colour. Augé-Laribé 
(1907), p.192. 
53 Loubère (1990) p.125. This latter figure includes AOC, VCC (Vin de pays) and VDQS (Vin Délimité de 
Qualité Supérieur). 
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4. Cooperatives 
The successful prohibition of cheap, artificial wines eliminated for low cost 
producers their main market competitors. However, it did little to resolve the difficulties 
that the small family producers faced because of their inability to capture economies of 
scale in wine making and their weak market power. Without the scientific knowledge 
and capital investment in cellars and equipment, wine quality was much poorer on the 
small farms than the large vineyards. In addition, lower transport costs favored high-
volume distribution, and transaction costs increased for wholesale merchants if they had 
to buy wines from large numbers of growers scattered over a wide territory. Large 
producers therefore sold their wine at higher prices. For example in France the huge 
Compagnie des Salins du Midi (C.S.M.), with facilities to produce 100 thousand 
hectoliters, was paid an average of 19.25 francs per hectoliter of wine in the period 
1893-1913, against a regional average of 16.00 francs. By contrast, a small producer of 
just 400 hectoliters (Gélly) received 27 per cent less than the C.S.M. during the period 
1893-1906. This difference was even greater in those years with the lowest prices, with 
Gélly being paid only 4.8 francs in 1904, against 11.5 francs received by the C.S.M.54  
Lack of storage space was another problem facing some growers (the non-
logés). Sometimes the area planted after phylloxera did not coincide with the old area of 
vines, and growers failed to build cellars, preferring to sell their wines directly from the 
fermenting vat. In other cases, they lacked the necessary capital to increase the capacity 
of their wineries to cope with the larger yields from the new vines, or failed to maintain 
capital investment in their cellars when they were producing little or no wine during 
phylloxera. In the village of Marsillargues (Hérault) in the Midi for example, growers 
had storage space for only 85 per cent of the village production (300,000 hectoliters); in 
Saint-Laurent d’Aigouzes (Gard) it was 75 per cent (of 160,000 hectoliters), and in 
Bompas (Pyrénées-Orientales), only 47 of the village’s 227 wine-growers had cellar 
space to store wines over the winter.55  Growers in Marsillargues in 1897 sold 55 per 
cent of their harvest in September, 14 per cent in October, and just 31 per cent over the 
following ten months.56 
As a result, although many family grape producers could remained competitive 
by working longer hours, they found it increasing difficult to survive in the making and 
                                                            
54 Pech (1975) p.158. 
55 Mandeville (1914), p.43. 
56 Cot (1900) cited in Gervais (1914), p.50. 
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maturing of their wines. A number of influential French writers from around 1900, 
including Charles Gide, Michel Augé-Laribé and Adrien Berget, saw wine co-
operatives as a solution. Cooperatives promised to produce better quality wines at a 
lower cost than those produced in the small ‘peasant’ cellars, and provide cheap storage 
space for wines to mature and be sold at higher prices later in the year. They also 
offered the possibility for processing the wine lees - the remains of the grapes after they 
had been crushed - to make alcohol and tartaric acid.57  
The creation of agricultural cooperatives depended both on the initial capital 
costs and the transaction costs associated with their internal governance.58 The first 
attempt at establishing a wine cooperative in France took place in Champagne in 1893, 
and despite the low wine prices between 1900 and 1907, there were still only 13 in the 
whole of France in 1908.59 Three problems in particular had to be resolved: lack of 
capital; the absence of experienced management, and the difficulties associated with 
measuring grape and wine quality. The first was partly solved by the law of the 29th 
December 1906 (together with the decrees of 30th May and 26th August, 1907), which 
allowed wine cooperatives access to long term credit at the almost uniform rate of 2 per 
cent interest over 25 years.60 Capital was provided by the state, but lent through 
regional credit banks, which were responsible for the loans. Local banks did the 
monitoring and transaction costs were reduced because cooperatives were require
establish a specific legal structure to receive the money. As a result, the 50 cooperatives 
in southern France between 1907 and 1914 obtained loans covering an average of 47 
cent of their capital costs, and the state gave subsidies of 815 thousand francs, an 
additional 1
d to 
per 
4 per cent.61  
                                                           
Finance was not the only obstacle. In some cases the potential economies of 
scale from selling wines were not exploited. For example, one of the largest cooperative 
 
57 Mandeville (1914), p.82. 
58 Valentinov (2007) 
59 Clique (1931), p.14. In Italy, a short-lived cantina sociale was established at Bagno a Ripoli, near 
Florence in 1888, and by 1910 there were reportedly ‘slightly in excess of 150’, and a further 40 
cooperative distilleries were also active. International Institute of Agriculture (1915), vol.2, p.152. 
60 Caupert (1921), p.111, Gervais (1914), Misaël (1914) and Mandeville (1914), pp.2 and 11. 
61 Mandeville (1914), p.139. This author noted that some co-operatives were not finished and therefore 
expenditure would rise, reducing in turn these figures slightly. The members of the Maraussan (Hérault) 
co-operative of the vignerons libres, for example, constructed and equipped a modern co-operative 
winery, with an initial capacity of 15,000 hectoliters, at a cost of 175 thousand francs, of which the 
Ministry of Agriculture contributed 30 thousand francs, the local regional bank (under the 1906 Law) 
provided a long-term loan of 109 thousand francs, and a further 30 thousand francs was raised from 
consumer co-operatives in Paris. The subscription of the 120 members was just 25 francs each. Gide 
(1926), pp.129-31. 
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in terms of cellar capacity in southern France in 1914 was that of Marsillargúes (60,000 
hectoliters), but it was the individual growers not the cooperative that sold the wine, as a 
poor sale was considered likely to discredit the cooperative’s management.62 Another 
problem was that while most producers planted a number of different grape varieties to 
reduce risk, cooperatives could only measure accurately (and therefore pay) the grape’s 
weight and sugar content. The inevitable result was members sold privately their best 
grapes, leaving for the cooperative the least desirable one.63 The initial high density of 
co-operatives in the Languedoc can therefore be partly explained by the region’s limited 
number of grape varieties, with the aramon (red) and clairette (white) predominating.64  
The number of wine co-operatives in France jumped from 13 to 79 between 
1908 and 1913, of which 50 were found in the south, and by the early 1930s the national 
figure was 630, significantly more than in either Italy or Spain.65  From the early 1950s 
the numbers increased everywhere, so that by 1970 cooperatives accounted for about 
half wine-production in France and Spain.66 Cooperatives allowed growers to dedicate 
more of their capital and labor to grape-growing, but they were now seen by the state as 
a useful instrument for controlling and regulating markets, and in particular by obliging 
cooperatives to hold stocks off the market or distil surplus wine.67 
 
5. Vertical integration and the New World 
Cooperatives helped growers integrate vertically by absorbing the functions of 
wine-makers and some of those of the merchants, but they could not influence prices 
because of their small size relative to the national market. Hoffman and Libecap have 
argued that cooperatives can raise prices only if the product is relatively homogenous, 
stocks difficult to accumulate and a significant number of individual growers will agree 
to output cuts which can be easily monitored.68 None of these held true for wine. 
Instead wine merchants in both California and Australia enjoyed some success in 
controlling markets through horizontal consolidation and vertical integration on a 
massive scale. This section explains how this was achieved, and also why similar 
attempts failed in Europe. 
                                                            
62 Mandeville (1914), pp.111-12. 
63 For Italy, see Berget (1925) cited in Clique (1931), p.241. 
64 Gide (1927), pp.92-3. For other factors explaining the regional distribution of co-operatives, see 
Simpson (2000) 
65 Simpson (2000), Table 5. In Algeria the figure was 17 per cent.  
66 The figure reached 52% in France in 1971 and 50% in Spain in 1969. 
67 Warner (1960) and Fernández García (2008) 
68 Hoffman Elizabeth and Gary D. Libecap (1991), pp. 397-411. 
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One major difference between these two countries and Europe was the large 
distances between the areas of production and markets. In Australia the high internal 
tariffs before Federation in 1901 made commercial producers look to the British market 
some 20,000 kilometers away, even though freight costs were approximately three times 
greater than those facing French exporters.69 In addition, the long sea voyage and the 
extremes in temperature resulted in all wines, especially the young ones and those ‘that 
have not been thoroughly well made’, to undergo a ‘very considerable and detrimental 
change’.70 Imported wines required several months rest on arrival, and faulty or young 
wines were often permanently ruined. These quality changes caused major problems for 
the trade. One prominent London West End merchant reportedly imported sixty 
hogsheads of South Australian wine because of its growing popularity, but it turned out 
so ‘ill-fermented’ that they resolved never to import any more direct from Australia.71 
By contrast, Australian producers complained that when they exported good wines, 
British merchants would claim that they arrived in poor condition and were only willing 
to pay low prices. For this particular late nineteenth century market to work, trusted 
agents were required at both ends of the chain: in Australia to check that only 
acceptable wines were shipped; and in London to determine the appropriate remedies to 
correct the wines after the journey. Distances were between the Californian wine 
producers and major East Coast markets were shorter, but they were still considerable 
given the volatile nature of most wines, and the ease that they could deteriorate. An 
additional problem was that most consumers in these two countries (together with the 
United Kingdom) were unaccustomed to drinking wines. Unlike Europe, where most 
consumers drank either directly from the family vineyard, or from a local tavern or café 
whose owner was responsible for blending their wines and creating reputation, the New 
World wine merchant had to attract new recruits to a drink whose quality he found 
difficulty in controlling. 
Another factor was that the 1.5 million or so growers in France found it 
considerably easier to persuade politicians to introduce new economic institutions to 
protected their interests than the 5,000 growers in California, or 3,000 in Victoria.  The 
new wine making equipment required large quantities of capital and wine makers would 
have no return if there were no grapes because producers had abandoned production. 
                                                            
69 Australian Vigneron), July 1892, p.48.  
70 Australian Vigneron), July 1892, p.47. 
71 Australian Vigneron), October 2 1893, p.114.  
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Vineyards were asset specific, implying that they had little value to their owners other 
than to produce grapes. But growers could sell these grapes for the table, or dry them to 
make raisins, rather than accept low prices from wine makers. More importantly 
Australia and California were both labor scarce economies, and persistently low grape 
prices would risk labor leaving to work in urban areas.72 While both California and 
South Australia, the increasing economies of scale being found in the new wine making 
technologies eroded the competitive position of the small wine maker, it also saw the 
appearance of specialist growers. The Pacific Wine and Spirits Review noted that by 
1900 most growers sold their grapes to wine-makers, ‘except to a limited extent in some 
of the older districts’, whereas previously nearly every vineyard had had its own 
fermenting house and storage cellar, and as early as 1882 Thomas Hardy, a leading 
producer in South Australia had noted that ‘the manufacture of wine is now almost 
wholly gone into the hands of those who make a business of it, and do not follow it 
merely as a secondary pursuit’.73 The growth in concentration in wine making can be 
seen in Table 3, with the largest ten wineries accounting for 14 per cent of South 
Australia’s production in 1868 and 67 per cent in 1903. 
A final factor was the question of distilling, and in particular the use of wine 
alcohol in the production of dessert wines such as port and sherry. In both countries, the 
state regulated distilling, which benefited large scale operations. In California, wine 
makers were allowed to fortify their wines with domestic grape brandy and avoid the 
$1.10 a gallon tax on brandy. This made fortified wines the cheapest form of alcohol on 
the market, and allowed producers to profitably distil their poorer wines and produce 
sweet fortified ones.74 It also helped reduce the technical problems associated with 
making wines in a hot climate, and therefore was especially attractive to producers in 
the Central Valley. Economies of scale were considerably greater in the production of 
dessert wines and distilling, encouraging new investment by the CWA in production 
facilities. After 1891 there was a rapid growth in the production of dessert wines, and by 
1913 they accounted for 45 per cent of all California’s production, of which 46 per cent 
was classified as port, 31 per cent as sherry, 12 per cent as muscatel, and nine per cent 
                                                            
72 Entry barriers to viticulture were less in the New World than in Europe, and a wider selection of 
employment alternatives existed should they decide to exit the industry. See Castella (1886), and Simpson 
(forthcoming) 
73 Pacific Wine & Spirits Review)(December, 1906), p.43 and Aeuckens, 1988, p.148. 
74  Seff and Cooney, in Muscatine, Amerine, and Thompson (1984), p.418. 
 23
angelica.75 In Australia, the leading wineries such as Seppeltsfield or Penfold’s also had 
distilleries, and dessert wines were becoming increasingly important in the years up to 
1914.  
 
 
Table 3 
Leading wine-makers in South Australia, 1868, 1876 and 1903 
 1868 1876 1903 
Vineyards Quantity 
produced
% of SA 
production
Quantity 
produced
% of SA 
production 
Quantity 
produced 
% of SA 
production
Largest three  1,637  4.4  4,546 20.3  42,960 37.0 
Largest five  2,546  6.9  6,428 28.7  57,962 49.9 
Largest ten   5,231 14.2   9,966 44.4   78,191 67.4 
Total State vintage  36,919  22,422  116,082  
Quantities in hectoliters 
Sources: Bell, 1993, Table 3 and Whitington, 1903, p.71. 
 
There were four major players in the Californian wine industry in the late 
nineteenth century: grape producers, wine-makers, San Francisco shippers and the East 
Coast bottlers and distributors.76 The rapid growth of the national market required new 
coordination arrangements between these businesses so that the high levels of capital 
investment in vineyards and wine making equipment were not left idle. Faced with 
falling prices and widespread adulteration of wines, the small wine makers established 
the California Wine-Makers Corporation (CWMC) in 1894 which entered into a five 
year agreement to sell their wine to the California Wine Association (CWA), another 
combine created in the same year by the leading West Coast dealers. By 1897 the 
CWMC represented 80 per cent of California’s wine-producers while the CWA had 80 
per cent of the wine. 77 However, post-contractual opportunistic behavior led to a ‘wine 
war’ between the two organizations, with the CWA supposedly refusing to pay the 
                                                            
75 Calculated from the California. State Agricultural Society (1915), p.140. 
76 This section is a summary of  Simpson (2008) 
77 Peninou and Unzelman (2000),p.79. 
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prices previously agreed, and the CWMA selling large quantities of wine directly to a 
New York merchant rather than through the San Francisco merchants, and in violation 
of its contract. After its legal defeat in 1899 the CWMC disappeared, leaving the field to 
the CWA. According to a recent history, the CWA between 1894 and Prohibition would 
‘cultivate more vineyard acreage, crush more grapes annually, operate more wineries, 
make more wine, and have a greater wine storage capacity than any other wine concern 
in the world’.78 This was horizontal consolidation and vertical integration – from grape 
growing to distribution – on a massive scale.  
The objective of the CWA was not fine wines but to develop a mass market for 
stable and unadulterated ones. As one critic noted, the company ‘never sold a bad bottle 
of wine’, but neither did it sell a ‘great bottle’.79  Percy Morgan, for many years the 
CWA’s chairman, noted in 1917 that forward integration helped create new markets for 
California’s wines: 
Until the coming of the California Wine Association only a few wineries tried to 
deliver their original packages direct to the consumer and build up a following for 
their label. The large dealer almost always sold California wines in bulk to distant 
jobbers who either bottled them with a domestic or foreign label known to their 
particular localities, or sold them to retailers who pursued a similar course. 
Moreover, these distributors and retailers had neither the knowledge not the 
facilities to age and handle wines properly. Only a large firm with capital could 
select from millions of gallons, blend to standards, market under labels that could 
gain the confidence of the public, and stand back of the label wherever sold.80 
 
Consolidations to escape price competition were common in the United States in 
the capital-intensive, mass-production industries in which ‘firms were closely matched 
and in which expansion had been rapid on the eve of the Panic of 1893’.81  The 
possibilities of collusion in the wine market was very difficult, but by integrating 
forwards and controlling distribution, the CWA was able to obtain higher prices in 
urban markets and guarantee a market for its own wines. Because of its scale, the CWA 
could blend wines in sufficiently large quantities to create a standardized product, and 
provide consumers with a guarantee that the wine was not adulterated. It also provided 
the necessary market stability for it to invest in brand names, and growers in California 
probably suffered less during the turbulent 1900s than any other wine growing region in 
the world. 
                                                            
78 Peninou and Unzelman (2000), p.33. 
79 Amerine and Singleton (1976 ed.), p.286. 
80 Percy Morgan, 1917, cited in Peninou and Unzelman (2000), p.125. 
81 Lamoreaux (1985), pp.45 and 87. 
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The high entry costs to marketing wines on the US East Coast before Prohibition 
were therefore overcome by a producer-led commodity chain. By contrast in Australia, 
it was a market-led chain which was created to sell wines in London.82 Trade was 
dominated by two major London houses that specialized in Australian wines: Walter 
Pownall, and in particular Peter Burgoyne, who claimed in 1900 that over the previous 
thirty years ‘fully 70 per cent of the wine exported from Australia to England had 
passed through his hands’. 83 In 1893 Burgoyne bought the Mount Ophir vineyard 
(Victoria), and investment in new wine making facilities from the turn of the century led 
one commentator to report that ‘it would be difficult to find in any part of the world a 
winery in which California labor saving appliances and the most approved European 
methods of securing the best treatment of the wine are so completely adopted’. Large 
quantities of grapes and wine were brought also from other producers, blended to create 
a standard product that was exported after nineteen months.  Burgoyne (and Pownall) 
had agents who selected wines in Australia, while in London the firm had around 4,500 
hogsheads of wine in bond, and a similar quantity at the Pelham Street premises in 
1912. Wines were sold by the cask and the bottle, using the Ophir (Burgoyne) and Emu 
(Pownall) brands. ‘Burgoyne’s Australian Wine’ placards were found ‘on every railway 
station in England’, and the Company claimed to have invested £300,000 in advertising. 
Finally, from the turn of the twentieth century, Burgoyne started a retail trade in 
Australia itself.84 
The control of the British market by these two importers encouraged producers 
to look to their state governments to intervene directly in the market, either by creating 
generic State brands (later ‘Australian’ brand) which ‘guaranteed’ the quality of the 
wines, or by creating a wholesale wine depot in London itself, such as the South 
Australian government did in 1894. Opposition from Burgoyne and the London trade 
press was immediate and vitriolic, and led to a trade boycott in the United Kingdom.85 
Although the Depot claimed to have sold South Australian wine to over 4,000 
customers, ‘including most of the best wholesale houses in London and the provinces, 
                                                            
82 See Gereffi, Korzeniewicz, and Korzeniewicz (1994) for a general definition, and Simpson 
(forthcoming) for a discussion of the wine industry. Australia exported at this time to the United Kingdom 
dry red table wine often referred to as a ‘Burgundy type’, which was somewhere ‘between the heavily 
fortified wines on the one hand, and light wines, such as clarets and hocks on the other’. Australian 
Vigneron), March 1902, p.236. 
83 Australian Vigneron), September 1900, p.115. 
84 Simpson (2009b) 
85 Proceedings of the Parliament of South Australia (1901), p.68, 2297. Thomas Hardy noted that ‘the 
large buyers would not touch the depot’.  
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large wine merchants, and grocers, as well as a number of high-class restaurants and 
clubs, who are now retailing the depot wines’ in 1900, and sales had increased three 
fold over five years, they were still just a fifth of what Burgoyne handled.86 The 
experiment ultimately failed because of limited management skills, lack of capital to 
mature wines, and the inability of the Depot to blend wines that it did not legally own. 
At the turn of the century, both the South Australian and Victorian governments held 
parliamentary enquiries into the potential advantages of central wine depots for the wine 
trade. Two questions in particular were debated: whether operations should be located at 
home in Victoria or South Australia, or in London; and whether the body should be a 
public or private institution. Many, such as Thomas Hardy and Arthur Perkins, believed 
that the wine depot should be located domestically for the purpose of buying, blending 
and maturing young wines for the London market.87 However, Burgoyne’s threat of 
buying wines only after their arrival in London rather than in Australia, led to 
opposition from leading domestic producers to the Depot, as they feared having to risk 
sending their wines to London at their own cost, and accept whatever merchants were 
willing to pay once it was there. Despite these problems, Australia was the only New 
World country with an important export trade, accounting for about a fifth of national 
production in the period 1909/13, and with virtually all being sold to the United 
Kingdom.88   
The success of the CWA and Burgoyne in restricting competition in their chosen 
markets did not go unnoticed by producers of cheap table wines in Europe, where some 
contemporaries believed that collective action by the growers themselves could raise 
prices. A couple of ambitious attempts were backed by the very large landowners in the 
Midi who had heavily over borrowed before 1900. 89 Bartissol in 1905 planned a 
marketing board that would sell annually 20 million hectoliters of branded wine in 
bottles directly to consumers. In case of overproduction, all growers would absorb the 
costs of distilling to reduce supply to support prices. However, many growers were 
reluctant to sign long-term contracts with an independent company. Even if a monopoly 
such as this might have increased wine prices, the capital requirements (300 million 
francs) and logistics of such a huge operation led to it remaining just a project. Palazy’s 
proposal in 1907 was more modest and involved the direct participation of growers, 
                                                            
86 Proceedings of the Parliament of South Australia (1901), p.iii. 
87 Proceedings of the Parliament of South Australia (1901), p.iv. 
88 Australian Vigneron), March 1902, p.236. 
89 Atger (1907), pp.116-22, Degrully (1910), pp. 375-85, Postel-Vinay (1989), pp.180-1. 
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who would sell wine to wholesalers and retail merchants. With a capital of just 48 
million francs, growers were required to enter agreements for five year, and the 
company hoped to sell a minimum of 12 million hectoliters of wine. Although it 
claimed to have 20,000 members and to control nine millions liters of wine, it failed in 
1906 as the Société Civile de Producteurs de vins naturels du Midi et de l’Algérie and in 
1909 as the Société Coopérative de Producteurs du Vins naturels du Midi, to negotiate 
discount privileges with the Bank of France and the Ministry of Finance.90 The major 
problem however was one of commitment, as growers were required to contribute to 
creating the company, but the potential benefits of higher prices would be enjoyed by 
all, whether they were members or not. As a result, when overproduction and low wine 
prices reappeared in the 1930s, growers looked directly to the state to resolve them, 
rather than create a private monopoly. Transaction costs associated with compliance 
were reduced and absorbed by the state, with the resulting legislation (Statut du Vin) 
both regulating markets and helping the small producers. From the 1950s intervention 
increased, and spread to other European states, allowing the small family grower to 
remain prominent today. 
 
Conclusion. 
  This paper has argued that the present day organization of the wine industry has 
historic origins which were clearly visible before 1914. The distinct sets of economic 
institutions that arose in different places were chosen not as an efficient adaptation to 
diverse environments, but rather for their distributional consequences. In Europe, 
cooperatives and regional denominations (later appellation d’origine contrôlée) helped 
to shift market power away from merchants towards small producers. The situation is 
most apparent in France, where farm groups in the late nineteenth century were 
supported by politicians of the Third Republic in their attempts to wrest control of the 
countryside away from the conservative, rural aristocrats and royalists. As Jules Ferry 
declared in 1884, ‘the Republic will be a peasants’ republic or it will cease to exist’.91 
While French politicians adopted policies that protected growers’ interests, the rural 
elites in Spain and Portugal continued to enjoy considerably more political power. With 
the exception of port, the state was unwilling to back the creation of appellations or 
provide sufficient finance for cooperatives. Both institutions became common only from 
                                                            
90 Caupert (1921), p.64-5. 
91 Wright (1964), p.13. 
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the 1950s when they performed important regulatory functions in exchange for public 
revenue. Cooperatives were obliged to remove surplus wine from the market, while 
appellations required growers to uproot high yielding vines and limit output. 
Wine production in Australia and California was always less important and 
growers were never able to exert similar levels of political influence. In part this was 
because of the difficulties in selling to consumers who were unacquainted with wine, 
and lived at considerable distance from the areas of production. In California this led to 
the consolidation of wine maturing and marketing in a single enterprise, based in San 
Francisco. After Prohibition, when the industry effectively had to start again from 
scratch, integration occurred once more, but this time it was out of state firms that 
moved into California and bought up the wineries.92  A similar storey is true in 
Australia, where Burgoyne’s influenced disappeared after 1914 with the growth in the 
British demand for dessert rather than dry table wines, and large vertically integrated 
wine companies sold wines through state organized depots. In the New World, the rapid 
growth of viticulture and the incorporation of the new wine making technologies after 
1890 allowed producers to plan a new industry. By contrast in Europe many wine 
regions were already well established prior to 1890, and growers and wine makers had 
instead to adapt to compete with the new areas of production.  
The set of economic institutions chosen on the eve of the Great War was a major 
factor in determining the future structures of the industry. In Europe, the small family 
grower has continued to enjoy the protection of the state, although the nature of 
institutions such as cooperatives and appellation d’origine contrôlée has adapted to 
reflect the shifts in economic and political influence of producers. While grape growers 
have demanded stable markets and a commercial future, governments have attempted to 
address structural problems of overproduction and short term gluts by requiring 
cooperatives to hold back stock and distill surplus wine, and growers to join 
appellations to improve wine quality, and indirectly reduce yields. 
                                                            
92Lapsley (1996). 
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